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Abstract 
As exemplified by the MDGs’ adoption in 2000, it was recently thought that poverty alleviation, hunger 
reduction and environmental conservation should be tackle simultaneously. For that purpose, forests 
people had to intensively exploit and to commercialize the wild resources (NTFPs) they usually foraged 
from the nature for their self-consumption and for marginal trade. After a first wave of optimism, most 
studies have however concluded that such outcome was dubious, i.e., that foraging was not able to 
sustain economic development. We consider a theoretical framework and provide an economic analysis 
explaining such result. We identify four cases, according to two distinctions. First, foraged wild 
resources can be used either for self-consumption or traded on the market. Second, foraging can be 
either an exclusive mode of production or be combined with farming. However, an economic 
development based on the intensive exploitation of wild resources (through specialized foraging and 
trade) is not sustainable in the long-term. When considered as an economic system, the persistence of 
foraging wild resources is only consistent with self-consumption or with marginal trade. Intensive 
foraging dedicated to trade and market extension lead to the disappearance of sharing (or cooperation) 
between foragers; wild resources as well as most foragers are likely to get worse in such situation even 
though some counter-examples can be identified. 
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1. Introduction 
Foraging is usually defined as the search for wild food resources. Such behavior is ubiquitous among 
animals and humans. For animals, it is central because it affects their fitness and therefore their ability 
to survive and to reproduce. For the same reason foraging behavior is also important for humans. Such 
importance has been recently highlighted by the MDGs‟ adoption in 2000. Indeed, during the 1990s 
three major problems became global challenges in the agenda of economic development agencies: 
poverty alleviation, the struggle against hunger and famine, and ensuring environmental sustainability. 
The first two challenges were gathered in the first MDG—eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger—while the third challenge was presented as the seventh MDG. In addition, it appeared that 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf             Journal of Economics and Public Finance                 Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016 
133 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
these three challenges were—under some circumstances—interdependent and therefore should be 
tackle simultaneously (Note 1). Indeed, in developing countries—especially those located in the 
tropical region—some of the poor people were living in the forests or in areas very close to the forests. 
Moreover, these “forest peoples” included foraging among their economic activities, and often it was 
even their main economic activity. Although they were poor, without cash income and capital, they had 
Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) from which they were able to forage Non-Timber Forest Products 
(NTFPs (Note 2)) in order to get their subsistence. It was thus believed that if these forest peoples were 
able to exploit more intensively and to commercialize the NTFPs they foraged, then a win-win situation 
will emerge (Peters et al., 1989). On the one hand, these foragers would have a higher (and cash) 
income from which they might eradicate hunger and start an accumulation process in order to sustain 
their economic development. On the other hand, because they have LEK and they get their resources by 
foraging NTFPs, they would take care of the forests, i.e., they would actively contribute to biodiversity 
conservation and environmental sustainability. While such view has led to optimism in the 1990s 
(Stiles, 1994; Delang, 2006a, 2006b), it has become progressively obvious that such view was dubious. 
Optimism was followed by skepticism and subsequently by pessimism, i.e., it became obvious that it 
was not possible to establish a sustainable economic development on a economic system mainly based 
on foraging (Shackelton et al., 2008; Sills et al., 2011; Stanley et al., 2012). For instance in a recent 
review of economic and ecological literature, Stanley et al. (2012, p. 1) conclude that “Roughly 75% of 
studies demonstrated that gatherers earned more than USD$2 PPP/day (the international absolute 
poverty line) or more than a local wage. These positive results do not, however, demonstrate that 
gathering reduces long-term poverty because forest dependence, and likely tenure security, remains low 
among these populations”. 
It is the aim of this paper to provide an economic analysis in a theoretical framework explaining why 
foraging—or more generally any economic system based mainly on extraction of resources from the 
wild—cannot lead to a sustained economic development. We therefore focus on the impact of 
intensified foraging and commercialization of wild resources on economic development. Even though 
it is of greatest importance, we do not deal in this paper with the impact of such strategy on biodiversity 
conservation (Note 3). 
For human, while foraging is considered as crucial at the individual level, its role at the social level 
seems of less importance. Indeed, in an economic perspective, foraging is only associated with survival 
or self-reproduction rather than with capital accumulation and economic growth. Therefore, and by 
comparison for instance with the production of food resources, foraging cannot lead to a sustainable 
economic development. Yet, when we consider material resources—including food resources—humans 
may satisfy their needs according to two different economic systems, extraction or production. In the 
former, human use various inputs (land, labor, capital, human capital) to extract material resources 
from the wild. In other words, the resources are produced by the nature, extracted, processed and 
consumed by humans. In the latter, humans also use inputs in order to produce material resources, e.g., 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf             Journal of Economics and Public Finance                 Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016 
134 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
to produce food resources through agro-pastoralist processes. While extraction and production are 
potentially two competing economic systems, economic development is the outcome of only an 
economy of production.  
An historical situation from the far past is useful because it illustrates why foraging cannot sustain 
economic development and therefore helps to explain the recent failure of foraging policies fostered by 
the MDGs adoption. It is associated with the pre-Neolithic period, i.e., before the introduction of food 
production which arose from 10.000 B.C. (Svizzero & Tisdell, 2014); let us recall its main features 
(Kelly, 1995). During the Palaeolithic and the Mesolithic periods—and thus during 98% of human life 
on earth—foraging was the only method available to get food resources. Foragers, called 
Hunter-Gatherers (HG), were roaming almost permanently to get their subsistence. Economic surplus, 
i.e., the excess of extraction over consumption, was extremely rare. When it existed, it was—according 
to Malthus‟s law—immediately used to increase the population level. The latter increased very slightly 
(Renfrew & Bahn, 2012, p. 456) and HG remained structured as “bands”, each band including few 
dozen of people linked by kinship. It is only with the introduction of agriculture and the so-called 
“Neolithic revolution” (Childe, 1936) that larger and more complex social organization appeared, such 
as tribes, chiefdoms and states (Service, 1975). It is also with the Neolithic revolution—and thereby 
under an economic system based on production—that the economic surplus grew large leading to the 
diversification of economic activities (pottery, metalworking, weaving…), the emergence of social and 
economic inequalities, and the introduction of features which characterized civilization (such as 
writings, government). Under the extraction economic system, HG remained locked at an early stage of 
economic development, considered by some authors as primitive or even savagery (Morgan, 1877). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the definition of wild resources as well as some 
of their uses and the various goals of foragers. In section 3 we present a typology of what people do on 
the supply-side of the market (forager/farmer) as well as on the demand side (self consumption/trade). 
Section 4 is about what happens when foragers get specialized in order to trade their production on the 
market. Sharing, a central feature of foragers‟ societies, and the conditions of its breakdown, is 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 analyses what happens when foragers-farmers get specialized in order 
to trade on the market what they harvest from the wild. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Wild Resources: Extraction and Consumption 
The number and variety of resources that can be considered as “wild” is very large. It contains plants 
(trees, fruits, nuts, weeds, fungi, roots, tuber, lichen…), terrestrial animals (Note 4) (mammals, birds, 
insects…), aquatic animals (fish, mammals, shellfish…), minerals (stones, precious stones, sand, coal, 
salt…) and water. We introduce a restriction in the sequel about the scope of wild resources; indeed we 
will consider only renewable wild resources (minerals are therefore excluded of the scope of our 
analysis). Although there is no widely accepted definition of what NTFPs are precisely (Ahenkan & 
Boon, 2011), it is clear that since they include all botanicals and other natural products extracted from 
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the forest other than timber, NTFPs are also included in the previous list of wild resources.  
2.1 Foraging, or How the Resources are Extracted from the Wild? 
Foraging has been and still is ubiquitous in human life. At any age of their life, in any circumstances, 
people are foraging, i.e., they are searching for material or immaterial resources which could be 
provided by the nature or produced by man. For instance, and concerning immaterial resources or 
information, web-users surf the Internet for desired data, and traders on the financial market face the 
traditional foraging trade-off (Saavedra et al., 2013). Similarly, any consumer evolving in a shopping 
center is foraging produced material resources. However and for simplicity, we restrict our analysis to 
the foraging of material resources provided by the nature, i.e., to wild resources (as defined previously).  
Even though they are labeled differently, such as “wild resources”, “forest products”, or “NTFPs”, they 
all have in common the fact that they are foraged or extracted—and not produced—from the nature. 
For this purpose, foragers use various techniques such as hunting, fishing, fowling, gathering, 
collecting (…). As for any production process, the techniques used by foragers require also inputs such 
as land (or water: sea, river, lake, marshes…), labor, capital and knowledge (human capital, called 
LEK). The analysis of the foraging process has been widely influenced by the study of animal foraging 
behavior. In the latter, a central result is provided by the marginal valuation theorem (Charnov, 1976). 
The Marginal Value Theorem is an optimality model that describes the strategy that maximizes gain per 
unit of time in systems where resources, and thus rate of returns, decrease with time. It is at the centre 
of optimal foraging theory which was applied initially to animal behavior (Pyke et al., 1977) and 
subsequently to human foraging behavior in what has been called “Human Behavioral Ecology” 
(denoted by HBE; Winterhalder & Kennett, 2006). In HBE, any human forager is assumed to behave as 
an animal does. He may encounter two different situations. In the first one, various resources are 
distributed in a given patch and thus the forager has to maximize the difference between the energy 
(when it is about food resources) or income provided by collected resources and the energy (or income) 
spent as a result of movement from one resource to another. When such situation is about food 
resources, it leads to the optimal diet model (or the diet breath model). In the second situation, one 
resource is unevenly distributed among various patches. The same logic as in the first case applies, but 
costs are associated now to movement from one patch to another. This leads to the patch choice model 
(or the optimal location model).  
2.2 What the Foraged Wild Resources Are Used for? 
Whereas wild resources that can be foraged are numerous, it should also be noted that they can be used 
for various and numerous purposes (Svizzero, 2016). The common belief about their use is that they 
ensure subsistence. This can be true but in addition to provide food resources—for humans and also for 
animals, e.g., fodder—foraged wild resources may also satisfy other basic human needs. Among the 
latter are the foraging of wild resources for medicinal purpose, in order to build shelters, to make 
clothes, to get fuel (…). Beyond the previous basic needs, which correspond to a biological goal, wild 
resources may also be used for other purposes. Indeed they may have cultural, religious or social 
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significance, e.g., for recreation (Note 5), and even ecological significance, i.e., when people wish to 
“commune” with nature as for instance most urban foragers do (McLain et al., 2014). There is thus a 
second goal associated with foraging, which can be defined as a socio-cultural goal. 
In addition to the previous query, “what are they used for”, many other features of wild resources, 
about their uses, are also important. For instance, how these resources are used? Should they be 
consumed on the spot or could they be stored? Once they are collected, could they be consumed 
directly as any final good or should they be first processed as any raw material? Among all the possible 
questions, one is of great importance for our purpose and is the following: who are consuming these 
wild resources? There can be two (non exclusive) answers. Either people who forage also consume the 
resources they extract: this is self-consumption, i.e., a situation in which people do not have reliance on 
the market to ensure their subsistence. Or people who forage sell on the market the resources they 
extract. They may sell on the market part of these resources (and then resources are used within the 
household and the market) or all the foraged resources (and then there is no self-consumption). 
Whatever the option they choose, their livelihood are dependent (completely or partially) on what will 
be the market equilibrium (i.e., the prevailing prices and the quantities exchanged). This defines the 
third goal of foraging, i.e., an economic goal. Another aspect of NTFPs stressed by Chambers (1987) is 
that in some developing countries they act as an economic security blanket to be drawn on in times of 
drought or economic hardship. 
 
3. Foragers/Farmers and Self-Consumption/Market Reliance: A Typology 
We have previously highlighted that the economic goal of foraging is associated with a first distinction 
between self-consumption and consumption from the market. It can be enriched by the introduction of 
a second distinction, i.e., whether people who extract wild resources are “pure” foragers or not. In the 
former case, they only forage, i.e., they do not produce any good. In the latter case, they forage and 
they also produce material resources; when for instance the latter include food resources, then people 
are called “foragers-farmers”. It should however be noted that, as recall and detailed by Pryor (2004), 
the frontier between foraging and farming is often blurred. Indeed, many HG exhibited some types of 
proto-agriculture. For instance, while they are commonly considered as HG, Australian Aborigines were 
using “fire-stick agriculture” in order to favor some plants by clearing the others or to attract wild game 
in freshly cleared meadows. 
We thus have two distinctions concerning wild resources: the first one is about the demand side, i.e., 
who are the users or consumers? The second one is about the supply side, i.e., who are the providers or 
producers? By combining these two distinctions, we get a typology of four distinct cases. 
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3.1 Case 1: “Pure Foragers” 
In the first case, people are “pure foragers”, they self-consume what they extract. This is what we 
usually have in mind when we talk about hunter-gatherers, and more precisely about pre-Neolithic HG. 
Indeed, the latter were obviously not producers of food resources because agriculture was invented later. 
Even if there were some exchanges of goods between bands of HG, they were restricted to luxury items 
or “exotic” such as precious stones used for ornaments. In other words, market were not well developed 
during the prehistoric period. This was due to physical as well as economical constraints: resources 
extraction by HG provided low-level or even no surplus, transportation was not easy and insecure, 
medium of exchange were often absent, most HG were nomads and therefore there was no marketplace 
where supply and demand could be met (…). Today, instances of case 1 must be very rare. 
3.2 Case 2: “Foragers-Farmers” 
In the second case, people can be defined as “foragers-farmers”, i.e., they gather wild resources, 
including food resources, and they also produce food resources through an agro-pastoralist process. 
However, and whatever the way they get their (extracted or produced) resources, the latter are totally or 
mainly used for self-consumption. In other words, the reliance on the market, in order to sell or to buy, 
is very limited. Potentially such situation may only exist once agriculture has been invented, i.e., at any 
period from the Neolithic period onwards. However it was more likely to occur when the productivity 
gap between the two economic systems, extraction and production, was low (Weisdorf, 2005, p. 583). 
This may correspond either to the early ages of agriculture or to region which are marginal for 
agricultural production (e.g., due to low soil fertility, water shortages, or harsh climate conditions). 
Such situation has been defined as “low-level food production” by Smith (2001); it is identified as a 
30-50% dependence on domesticated plants and animals, the remaining food being derived from 
hunting and gathering. In fact, a variety of subsistence economies, extant, historic, and prehistoric, 
drew upon both elements of hunter-gatherer and agricultural modes of production (Svizzero & Tisdell, 
2015). These are difficult to characterize in existing terminologies except as „mixed‟ economies 
(Winterhalder & Kennett, 2006, pp. 2-4). Compared to case 1, case 2 seems still to be not that 
uncommon. The Mikea (living in the southwest of Madagascar) is an example of case 2 (Stiles, 1998). 
3.3 Case 3: “Foragers-Traders” 
As the second case is, the third case is also an extension of the first case but now we consider 
“foragers-traders”. In this situation, foragers do not produce any goods, such as food resources or 
anything else, but they sell on the market a significant part of what they collect from the wild. 
Potentially, this may occur in a world in which only foragers are living; however it is more likely to 
occur in a world where agriculture also exists (and other economic activities based on production as 
well). Although it is not restricted to this continent, many examples of foragers-traders have existed and 
are still present in Asia (Morrison, 2005) and elsewhere also (Svizzero & Tisdell, 2015). For Asia, 
numerous and various examples illustrating what is sold (or was sold in the past) by “foragers-traders” 
are provided by Morrison (2005, p. 285): rattans, precious woods (scented woods, camphor, 
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sandalwood, teak…), ores (tin), bird‟s nests, sea slugs, bird of paradise feathers, hunted animals, honey, 
medicinal plants, spices (pepper, cardamom, ginger, clove, nutmeg…). For all continents, examples of 
foragers bands or tribes illustrating case 3 are for instance provided in Stiles (2001, pp. 45-46), and are 
presented in an historical perspective. This author also distinguishes sporadic exchange from regular 
and intensified exchange. 
3.4 Case 4: “Foragers-Farmers-Traders” 
The fourth case is complex and also wide-spread (Bharucha & Pretty, 2010). Indeed, people must be 
considered as “foragers-farmers-traders”. This means that they do foraging as well as farming, that they 
self-consume part of what they extract and/or produce and sell the remaining part on the market. This 
case is complex because there exists an infinite number of possible combinations of foraging/farming 
and of self-consumption/market-consumption. Indeed, the degree of dependence on NFTPs varies and 
their use of forests seem to vary. Moreover, many handcraft and artwork products sell to tourists by 
forest people all over the world are made from forest products (carved wood, shells…). Case 4 is 
widespread because it encompasses diverse groups of people, such as what are still considered as HG 
(e.g., Kung, Mbuti or Hadza in Africa, Pwo Karen or Mlabri in Thailand, Ache in Paraguay…), but also 
forest people, many agricultural communities (especially in developing countries) and, to some extent, 
urban foragers. 
3.5 The Typology 
 
Table 1. A Typology Based on Demand and Supply Sides Economic Activities 
 Self-Consumption Trade on the Market 
Only Foraging Case 1 Case 3 
Foraging and Farming Case 2 Case 4 
 
In the sequel, we will study two transitions: 
From case 1 to case 3 (in section 4) 
From case 2 to case 4 (in section 6) 
Both transitions consider what happen when people decide to intensively exploit and commercialize 
wild resources. Please note that the transitions from case 1 to case 4, and from case 2 to case 3 are not 
relevant.  
The transition from case 1 to case 2 is not studied since it does not consider trade on the market, it is 
out of the scope of the present paper. For reasons explaining why such transition from foraging to 
farming is either effective, delayed, or impossible, see for instance Svizzero and Tisdell (2015). 
The transition from case 3 to case 4 is not studied because it considers that commercialization of wild 
resources is already ubiquitous, whatever is the method (foraging or farming) used to get traded 
resources. 
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4. From Unspecialized Foraging and Self-Consumption to Specialized Foraging and Trade (Case 
1 to Case 3) 
In this section we consider a simplified economy in which only foraging or resources extraction is 
possible. Initially all people self-consume the resources they extract from the wild (this is case 1, i.e., 
“pure foragers”). Afterward, they remain foragers but they are now able to self-consume and also to 
trade on the market the resources they extract (this is case 3, i.e., “foragers-traders”). Such evolution 
(from case 1 to case 3) rises three important questions. Before we turn to each of these three questions, 
let us first consider a necessary condition for foraging to exist, whatever foraged wild resources are 
used for. 
4.1 The Land Tenure System and Access to Wild Resources 
Even though it seems tautological, in order to forage, it is necessary on the supply-side that any forager 
be able to have access to the wild resources. This raises the problem of land tenure which is crucial for 
any economic development based on foraging. The major threat to the NFTPs used by tribals is the 
transformation of forested areas by non-tribals. This includes the conversion of forested land to 
agriculture (Swanson, 1994), e.g., the plantation of monoculture forests. Even though the access to wild 
resources is “warranted”, the contribution of access of NFTPs to reducing poverty remains contentious. 
What is clear is that if some groups were denied access to such resources, then they would suffer 
increased poverty. This does not however mean that access to these resources and their possible scale is 
capable of raising the incomes of villagers that use these resources to any significant extent. 
4.2 Division of Labor, Surplus and Trade 
The first important question is why foragers decide to trade on the market (rather than self-consuming 
all the resources they forage)? If they decide to trade it is because some foragers have a comparative 
advantage in the extraction of some or at least one wild resources while other foragers have also a 
comparative advantage in the extraction of some other or at least one another wild resources. In other 
words, all foragers derived a surplus from their activities but for different resources. Therefore, they 
may trade each other their surplus throughout the market and thus they all improve their welfare. This 
is Ricardo‟s (1817) theorem of comparative advantage (Note 6) related to international trade which is 
here simply applied to different groups or bands of foragers rather than to different nations. 
The second important question is what is necessary in order to trade foraged resources on the market? 
In addition to the previous condition, it is also necessary that any forager be able to have a surplus. This 
can occur naturally if, for instance, a wild resource is particularly abundant in some area and is also 
easy to collect, to transport and to store (e.g., wild cereals, acorns, nuts, shellfish, bamboos, rattan…). 
More generally, such surplus may be the result of specialized foraging. This is the application of Adam 
Smith‟s (1776) conclusion about the division of labor. Indeed, there can be a division of labor between 
foragers belonging to the same band or between different bands of foragers. Such division of labor may 
be the result of various influences such as the relative abundance of resources in different territories, 
the different abilities among foragers, institutions or the relative level of development. As demonstrated 
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by Ruiz-Pérez et al. (2004) in a detailed analysis based on 61 cases (Note 7), the division of labor, i.e., 
the specialization of forest peoples, is mainly driven by markets. Under such division of labor, foragers 
become specialized; this specialization leads to an increase of their productivity (through learning by 
doing) and therefore to an increase of the surplus they extract. On the demand-side, the trade on the 
market of foraged resources requires several conditions. Foragers must have a physical access to the 
market, i.e., transportation costs (especially for remote foragers) must not be too excessive. Moreover, 
the resources they sell must be desired at any income level and their demand must be an increasing 
function of consumers‟ income. In other words, wild resources must be normal goods rather than 
inferior goods. 
4.3 Wild Resources: From Intensive Exploitation to Extinction 
The third important question is what are the consequences on the development of the foraging economy 
when foragers implement a more intensive and specialized extraction of wild resources? Even though 
the conclusions are the same, we may distinguish the consequences, on the one hand, on the economic 
profitability of foraging activities and, on the other hand, on the socio-economic organization of 
foragers. We first deal with the former consequences while the latter are presented in the next section 
(section 5). 
When foragers decide to get specialized, this has two opposite effects on the productivity in foraging. 
On the one hand—and as highlighted previously—their productivity is improved due to learning by 
doing. On the other hand, excessive extraction—i.e., extraction done at any rate beyond the natural rate 
of growth of the wild resource considered—leads to a decrease of the stock of the resource; thus 
foraging exhibits diminishing returns. If excessive extraction is persistent, it may even lead to the 
extinction of the resource, as exemplified by Smith (1975) for the prehistoric megafauna extinction 
explained through the overkill hypothesis (Note 8). While the two effects on foragers‟ productivity are 
opposite, it is likely that the productivity will decrease continuously in the long-term. This is so 
because specialized foraging fosters excessive extraction. Indeed, competition among specialized 
foragers, i.e., the quest of continuous larger amount of surplus is supported by the increased level of the 
market demand and is also facilitated by the land tenure system of foraging economies, namely by 
common property regimes (Weisdorf, 2005, pp. 573-574; North & Thomas, 1977). We reach here the 
following conclusion: specialized foraging does not lead to sustainable economic development because 
foragers‟ productivity is decreasing with the passage of time. Therefore, two cases are possible. First, 
after a while, forager‟s productivity is so low that specialization becomes less profitable than foraging 
without specialization. This leads foragers to give up their commitment with the market and to reverse 
to the initial situation, i.e., to forage only for their self-consumption. Second, even if it decreases 
continuously, the productivity provided by specialized foraging remains higher than in other activities. 
Excessive extraction is thus maintains until the stock of the concerned wild resource be completely 
depleted.  
One may however object to the previous conclusion that some wild resources (e.g., bamboos) are very 
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abundant whatever the amount extracted is, and therefore there is no reason that foragers‟ productivity 
decreases, i.e., such specialized foraging seems sustainable. In fact it is not, in any cases. This can be 
demonstrate as follows, through the analysis of the market demand of such wild resource. Two cases 
are possible. First, since the resource is abundant, we may assume that its supply remains always higher 
than the demand, and the latter may even saturate. Therefore the price of the resource remains very low 
and there is no obvious reason (except if they are constrained to) explaining why some foragers have 
decided to specialize in the extraction of this resource. Second, if the demand is not saturated (i.e., it is 
continuously increasing when the price tends to zero), despite the abundance of the resource, this 
means that the latter is very valuable for market‟s stakeholders. This will foster effort in order either to 
domesticate and then to produce this resource, or to produce goods which are close substitutes of the 
wild resource (e.g., most—if not all—products made from bamboos have substitutes goods made from 
plastic or metal). In both situations, the demand of the wild resource will decrease, as well as the 
profitability associated with its extraction. 
We have demonstrated that an economic system based on specialized foraging and market-consumption 
cannot lead to a sustainable economic development. In other words, an economic system with 
foragers-traders is possible only if trade remains marginal, i.e., if the traded wild resources correspond 
to a fortuitous surplus. Such situation is illustrated by what are called “complex HG” societies (Price & 
Brown, 1985; Keeley, 1988; Sassaman, 2004). Indeed, these “pure foragers” were labeled as complex 
HG (Note 9) because they were exploiting abundant and valuable resources (Note 10) and therefore 
were able to extract a significant surplus. However, most of this surplus was used for self-consumption 
(and therefore, according to Malthus‟ law, it has supported population growth of these societies) and 
only a marginal part of it was traded between bands of complex HG. Despite the existence of such 
surplus, any of these complex HG societies has not been able to trigger a significant economic 
development such as the one which has later been caused by the introduction of agriculture. 
 
5. Communal Sharing in Foraging Societies: A Central Feature and Its Breakdown due to 
Market Extension  
According to most (if not all) approaches of foraging, foragers‟ decision require a fine balance between 
the exploitation of their rewards and the exploration of different options (i.e., switching to another 
resource or to another patch). This balance is commonly referred to as the exploitation-exploration 
trade-off (Cohen et al., 2007; Berger-Tal et al., 2014; Mehlorn et al., 2015).  
5.1 Sharing, the Central Socio-Economic Feature of Foragers’ Society 
It is also widely agreed in the academic literature that there is no optimal solution to the 
exploitation-exploration trade-off. However the latter is influenced by individual, social and 
environmental factors (Mehlorn et al., 2015). Among these influences, the social factor is of great 
importance for our purpose. Indeed, while foraging is asocial (or solitary foraging)—i.e., without 
competition or coordination with con-specifics—for many animals, it is not for all animals and 
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especially for human. In fact socially foraging species (e.g., animals such as ants, felids…) minimize 
the exploitation-exploration trade-off by having individuals specialized in either exploitation or 
exploration and working together (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000). This is especially true for human, i.e., 
the analysis of human foraging behavior should be systematically done from a social foraging point of 
view. Indeed, human foraging is social and, in addition, it also includes a unique element (compared to 
what non-human animals do), the creation of resource pooling systems (Delton & Robertson, 2012). In 
this type of social foraging, people contribute when they have excess resources and receive some 
provisions when in need. The latter may occur either because foraging is very risky—by nature it 
provides returns featured by high variance—or because injury and illness can prevent a person of 
foraging for extended periods. Resources pooling prevents of shortfalls, i.e., ensures risk reduction. It is 
also called “sharing” and is a feature of any group of foragers. For instance, sharing was a central 
feature of hunter-gatherers societies of the far past (e.g., during the pre-Neolithic period). While these 
pre-Neolithic HG were “pure foragers” (because agriculture has been introduced later), sharing is 
remained the central feature of “modern HG” societies, even though foraging was not for them the only 
method they use to get food resources (Lee, 2004; Lee & Daly, 2004). 
5.2 Foraging, a Cooperative Economic Strategy 
From a microeconomic point of view, the extraction of wild resources can be compared to the 
production of goods. Indeed, both techniques can be simply compared throughout their respective 
productivity, e.g., the marginal productivity of labor (Weisdorf, 2005). At a larger scale of 
analysis—such as a band of foragers—such comparison is not relevant. In such a band, foragers adopt 
very different strategies. Some of them adopt very risky strategies, e.g., hunting large mammals which 
are quite rare, difficult to hunt and provide few calories compared to the energy spent during the hunt. 
Others prefer more secure strategies, such as gathering wild plants (e.g., nuts, pinions…) or animals 
(shellfish…) which are abundant, easy to collect and provide a very high ratio of calories. These 
differences in the economic behavior of foragers is however rational because those foragers belong to a 
same band in which there is a social rule, namely sharing food resources (and even beyond food 
resources). At least six different theories have been proposed to explain the existence and patterning of 
intra-group food sharing (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; Gurven & Jaeggi, 2015); however the outcome of 
risk-reduction is consistent with all six. In other words, some foragers adopt risky strategies because 
they know that if their hunt fail, they will nevertheless have food provided by the other foragers of their 
band and through the sharing system. Therefore, a band of foragers cannot be viewed as a set of 
producers (or firms) competing on the market; through the sharing system, they behave in a cooperative 
manner and thus the behavior of any forager cannot be analyzed separately from the behavior of the 
band as a whole. An analogy between the market economy and the foraging economy can be 
established as follows. The foragers who belong to a same band have socio-economic relationships 
among them which are similar—even though they are less hierarchical—to the relationships between 
the employees of a given firm (Note 11). 
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5.3 Market Extension and the Transition from Cooperation to Competition 
We have previously recall that sharing—i.e., common sharing or communities sharing—was a central 
feature of foragers societies. In other words, cooperation among (unspecialized) foragers is the social 
norm. We now demonstrate that such norm cannot be maintained when foragers become specialized 
and involved in market transactions, i.e., when the transition under study is from case 1 to case 3, as 
presented in the previous section. Indeed, when foragers become specialists, any of them is no more 
facing the exploitation-exploration trade-off because, by definition, he is now specialized in the 
exploitation of a wild resource. Therefore, the division of labor between exploiters and explorers 
disappears, and the associated resources pooling system becomes unsustainable. Now the division of 
labor among foragers is not associated with sharing but with another “social norm”, i.e., with the 
existence of the market. On the market the social norm between specialized foragers is now 
competition (it was cooperation between unspecialized foragers) and risk insurance is now provided by 
the “invisible hand” (it was initially provided by sharing). Thereby, we reach our first conclusion: when 
foragers get specialized in order to trade their surplus on the market, the relationship between them 
shifts from cooperation to competition. In other words, specialized foraging and trade are not consistent 
with what is considered as the natural socio-economic structure of foragers societies. Since the latter is 
deeply transformed, it is less likely that specialized foraging may lead to sustainable economic 
development. For instance a fundamental input in the foraging process is LEK and its transmission 
among foragers is closely associated with the norm of sharing. While LEK is clearly a public good, its 
production and transmission across foragers and generations of foragers becomes uncertain when 
sharing is removed by the market. Foraging is therefore unsustainable in the long term if it is 
specialized and market-oriented. The same conclusion has been reached when we have previously 
considered the evolution of foragers‟ economic profitability. 
 
6. From Mixed Economies and Self-Consumption to Specialization in Foraging or Farming and 
Trade 
In section 4 we have assumed that foraging was the only method available to get resources. Now we 
still consider a simplified economy but we enrich it: foraging still exists but farming is also possible. 
This implies that any people can be a forager and a farmer (this is case 2) at the same time (Note 12), 
i.e., that he has to decide how much effort (or working time) can be allocated to each activity in order 
to get resources (respectively extracted and produced resources). In addition to the previous decision 
relative to the distribution of his effort, any forager-farmer also has to decide either to self-consume his 
resources or systematically to trade his surplus and to rely on the market for his own consumption. The 
latter situation corresponds to case 4, defined as “foragers-farmers-traders”. 
In such economy, the main question seems to be under which circumstances people (foragers-farmers) 
decide to shift from self-consumption (case 2) to market-based consumption (case 4)? However, we 
have already answered to this question in the sections 4 and 5 of the present paper. Indeed, if people 
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decide to only self-consume what they extract and produce, there is no exchange through the market 
and therefore their welfare will be at its lowest level. In other words, and once again according to 
Ricardo‟s theorem of comparative advantages, people will have welfare gain if they get specialized (in 
foraging or farming activities), derive a surplus and trade it on the market. Of course, and as seen 
previously, even if they get specialized, this does not mean that a sustainable economic development 
will be the long-term outcome associated with this decision. Thus, the important question is about what 
to do on the supply-side of the economy, i.e., to forage or to farm? In order to answer this question, we 
consider the various relationships that may exist between the outputs of both activities. 
6.1 Perfect Substitute Goods and Compared Productivities 
Such question has already been studied in the abundant literature about the transition from foraging to 
farming, i.e., as an explanation of the Neolithic revolution (Weisdorf, 2005). An implicit assumption in 
this literature is that the wild resources extracted and the farmed products are similar or very close 
substitutes (Note 13). Therefore, all these resources and products are exchanged on the same market; 
competition on the latter can be considered as perfect competition (when there is an infinite number of 
suppliers) or as Cournot (or quantity) competition (when the number of suppliers is low). The 
profitability of each activity depends on the supply-side conditions, i.e., on the respective costs of each 
activity. For simplicity, it is often assumed that the cost is only related to the labor input, and thus to the 
productivity of the latter. In other words, the decision to forage or to farm is directly defined by the 
comparison of the labor productivity in both activities. Two different outcomes are possible. 
The first one is when the gap between labor productivities in both activities is small. In such situation, 
suppliers decide to forage and to farm, i.e., they do not become specialist. It is widely agreed that the 
labor productivity of foraging is low; thus if the gap with labor productivity in farming is low, it means 
that the latter productivity is also low. This may occur either during the early ages of agriculture (Smith, 
2001) or in areas which are marginal (Note 14) for agriculture (Bellwood & Oxenham, 2008, pp. 
28-29). In both cases, labor productivity is low and therefore it is likely that foraging and farming do 
not provide any surplus and are only sufficient to ensure self-consumption. Without surplus, any 
economic development is hence impossible. 
The second outcome is when the gap between labor productivities in both economic systems is large. 
This means that one activity is competitive while the other is not; after a while, the latter will disappear 
and only one activity (foraging or farming) will remain. This is the natural outcome of competition 
among suppliers of substitute goods on a same market. Let us assume that foraging is the more 
competitive, i.e., that labor productivity in foraging is strictly higher than in farming. The question is 
what will be the outcome in the long-term? In fact we have already answer to that question (see section 
4) because this situation is when people decide to get specialized in foraging. As previously 
demonstrated, such situation is not sustainable in the long-term. 
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6.2 Different Goods, Dual Economy and Craft Industry 
The previous comparison between foraging and farming through the comparison of their respective 
productivity of labor is valid only if the outputs of both economic systems are close substitutes. 
However, we may consider many situations in which these outputs are different goods (Note 15) (i.e., 
are not substitute at all). Thus, if both economic systems lead to a surplus, each surplus is trade on a 
different market. Foragers and farmers are not (direct) competitors. The variation of the labor 
productivity in both activities is simply reflected by variation of the relative price of both goods. 
In such situation, the economy is dual, with a sector of farmed products and a sector of foraged 
resources. Although both sectors are separated on the supply-side, they interact on the demand-side 
throughout the income distribution. From their activity, specialized foragers derive a surplus they trade, 
and hence they earn an income. They will use this income in order to buy resources and products in 
both market. Since the farming sector produces only edible products and the foraging sector provides 
non-edible wild resources (when outputs of both sectors are different goods), this means that foragers 
will tend to spend (most of) their income for buying farmed food products. Then, these foragers will 
tend to have no self-consumption, to be completely dependent on the market for all the edible products 
they consume (except the resources they forage). In other words, even if they still forage (the wild 
resources they trade) they tend to become very different from what is usually considered as “foragers”. 
Indeed they constitute a subset of the agrarian economy which can be defined as an “industry”. An 
economic development can emerge from a dual economy consisting of an agricultural sector and an 
industrial sector but its sustainability is dubious. Indeed, two situations can be associated with this 
industrial sector. In the first one, foragers are providing to the market wild resources that are not 
transformed, i.e., raw materials (e.g., bamboos). In exchange, they get from the market transformed 
products (e.g., flour, bread, biscuits) provided by the farming sector. While farmed and transformed 
products provided added value, foraged raw materials do not. Thus, the market exchange is likely to be 
characterize by a long-term decline in terms of trade. The latter means that, although they 
commercialize wild resources, foragers get impoverished with the passage of time, i.e., are not able to 
sustain an economic development. The second situation is when foragers extract and also transform 
wild resources before they sell them on the market. Because most foragers do not have access to large 
amounts of capital, they are not able to develop a “true” industry; hence, their activities are considered 
as a craft industry. In such a dual economy—with an agricultural sector and a craft industry—the role 
of foraging per se is minor. Indeed, most added-value of the craft industry is provided by craftsmen‟s 
skills rather than by the wild resources they use to produce crafts. In other words, it is not the foraging 
part of the craft process of production which sustain the economic development. 
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6.3 Substitutes and Differentiated Goods 
There also exist intermediary situations in which foraged resources and produced goods are neither 
similar (or perfect substitutes) nor different. This is when goods are substitutes and differentiated (Note 
16). The goods perform the same basic functions but have differences in qualities such as type, style, 
quality, reputation, appearance, and location that tend to distinguish them from each other. To some 
extent this corresponds to what is also called “emerging middle ground” (Sills et al., 2011). The market 
structure is characterized by monopolistic competition which involves a great deal of non-price 
competition. Indeed, any forager as well as any farmer have a degree of control over price, i.e., he can 
raise his prices without losing all of his customers because any individual supplier's demand curve is 
downward sloping. For any people, the choice between foraging and farming leads to a specialization 
based on product differentiation.  
The standard conclusion of monopolistic competition applied in our particular framework. This means 
that in the long run, a monopolistically competitive supplier will make zero economic profit. In other 
words, foraging and farming co-exist, even in the long run, but they may not lead to an accumulation 
process consistent with sustainable economic development.  
6.4 Ecological Inheritance and Externality 
Until now, we have assumed—at least implicitly—that foraging and farming were two independent 
economic activities between which people have to distribute their effort. However, these two activities 
can be dependent, beyond the willing of people. In other words there may exist some externalities 
linking foraging and farming. Such externalities exist because the productivities of foraging as well as 
of farming depend on the ecosystem and that both economic systems also have an influence on the 
ecosystem. In HBE, the latter is labeled the effects of ecological inheritance (Freeman et al., 2015). For 
instance, agriculture (e.g., fields of crop) attracts game and thus provides, in the short-term, a positive 
externality for hunters. However such externality is likely to be negative in the long-term because 
agriculture modifies the landscape, implies deforestation, i.e., leads to an ecosystem which is less 
favorable for wild animals, and thus for hunters. Because such externalities can be positive at one stage 
and negative later, when they are taken into account in the analysis it is difficult to reach any definitive 
conclusion about what is the most efficient decision, foraging or farming. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have previously demonstrated that intensive foraging and commercialization of wild resources 
cannot lead to a sustainable economic development as it was thought when the MDGs were adopted. 
The main reason explaining such result is that while the extraction of wild resources is a technique 
which can be compared to the production of goods, foraging cannot be restricted to a technique and 
even to an economic system. Indeed, foraging is a socio-economic system, i.e., an economic system 
which is socially embedded (Note 17). In a foraging economy—whatever the period it exists—social 
embeddedness is ubiquitous because sharing is the main feature of such economy (Lee, 2004; Lee & 
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Daly, 2004). From an economic point of view, the supply and the demand of any foraging 
economy—even though such economy is very small, e.g., associated only with a band of foragers—are 
not independent (Note 18). Thus, any change to the supply-side has consequences on the demand-side, 
and vice et versa.  
Thus, the shift from a foraging economy dedicated to self-consumption to a specialized and intensive 
foraging economy devoted to trade wild resources on the market is likely to have two negative 
outcomes associated with the disappearance of sharing. First, many foragers may suffer of the shift 
from a cooperative to a competitive system, i.e., many of them can be impoverished (especially those 
who adopt risky strategies and/or are unlucky). Second, and even though it was not the aim of the 
present paper (Note 19), we may surmise that many wild resources can be endangered due to excessive 
extraction. Both outcomes are simply opposite to what was the initial wish of those who fostered forest 
peoples to exploit and commercialize forest products. 
7.1 Market Extension and Its Socio-Economic Consequences on Sharing  
However, the link between specialized foraging and commercialization, and the breakdown of 
communal sharing must be qualified because the latter seems more related to market extension. As 
shown previously, it is true that the existence of the market allows increased specialization and greater 
division of labor. It may result in a breakdown in communal rules. However, it is not clear that this is 
due to specialization per se or to division of labor. Indeed, the argument that increasing division of 
labor results in a lack of co-operation and ultimately unsustainable economic development must be 
qualified. Division of labor occurred in most primitive societies. Australian Aboriginal women mostly 
gathered food whereas the men hunted large animals and made important tools. Sharing of food was 
very important for their economic security. Similarly, it is not systematic that increased specialization 
results in foragers no longer co-operating. It could be more vital to do so because of the risks associated 
with specialization. 
However, the effects of markets are not only to increase the division of labor and specialization. Indeed, 
it is probably more the effects of market extension, rather than the increased division of labor and 
specialization, which results in a breakdown in communal sharing. Such extension has economic as 
well as social consequences on foragers. Concerning the former, when they trade on the market the 
wild resources they harvest, foragers thereby have access to a cash economy. This could help them to 
reduce their incentive for co-operation because money can be used as a store of values and savings can 
be drawn on in time of need. This is not to say that villagers did not have other stores of value in some 
cases prior to cash. For example, livestock where sometimes used as a store of value, and still are in 
some cases. However, because money or cash income is intrinsically associated with perfect liquidity, it 
tends to be preferred to any other store of value. Concerning the latter, i.e., the social consequence of 
market extension, one should noticed that the universe of tribals expands as they come into contact 
with the market system of non-tribals. This changes their outlook and possibilities, and places new 
pressures on them, e.g., to send their children to school.  
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7.2 Sharing, Foraging and Biodiversity Conservation 
The existence of sharing has also consequences on biodiversity conservation. When it is compared to a 
production process, the extraction of wild resources is characterized as different for two reasons. On the 
one hand, it is associated with diminishing marginal returns because, mechanically any extraction 
reduces the remaining stock of wild resources and therefore requires additional effort for the 
subsequent extraction. On the other hand, excessive extraction—beyond the carrying capacity—can 
lead to depletion or extinction of the wild resources. Both explanations are valid if we consider a 
microeconomic analysis, i.e., the impact on the nature of a particular forager‟s actions. However these 
explanations must be qualified when are analyzed the impacts of a band of foragers‟ actions. Indeed, 
once again sharing is present among foragers belonging to a same band. Moreover, the sharing rules 
can be interpreted as an implicit tax on the harvest of renewable resources (Chakraborty, 2007). Such 
tax lowers the marginal return to resource harvesting, which reduces effort and increases the stock of 
wild resources. In other words, foraging does not necessarily lead to overexploitation of wild resources. 
On the contrary, in a foraging economy, sharing avoids waste of food and favors resource conservation 
because it reduces foragers‟ incentives to extract wild resources. 
Of course, the previous conclusion depends on the land tenure system. If there are no communal rules, 
i.e., if there is a de facto open-access system, then items of greatest use value would be threatened with 
annihilation whether marketed or not. However, the threat would be greater if they could be marketed 
because this would give scope to buy commodities having considerable utility. When suitable 
communal rules exist, foragers may adopt practices which favor their desired species, thereby altering 
biodiversity. The fire-stick culture of Australian Aborigines is reputed to have done this, even though 
these people engaged in sharing to some extent. Given communal rules, what was conserved would 
have been influenced by use value and presumably was a common incentive to conserve items of 
greatest value. This did not necessarily conserve biodiversity. 
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Notes 
Note 1. See Svizzero and Tisdell (2016) for the difficulties encountered in order to tackle 
simultaneously MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals. 
Note 2. For a recent and detailed analysis of the definition(s) of NTFPs, see Ahenkan and Boon (2011). 
Note 3. See Tisdell (2014) for a complete study of this topic, and especially chapter 16. 
Note 4. It remains contentious whether or not feral animals should be considered as wild, even though 
some of them are hunted. 
Note 5. As some modern hunters or (no kill) fishers do; see also wild plants gathered for gardening, 
wild animals caught in the wild and kept in zoo, aquarium or as pets (…). 
Note 6. Ricardo‟s theorem also includes a condition on the level of the international relative price of 
exchanged goods in order to ensure the existence of mutual welfare gains; here we do not consider it 
because it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Note 7. These 61 cases of the commercial production and trade of (different) non-timber forest products 
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America—encompass different strategies adopted by forest peoples such as 
the four cases we have defined but also some cases of forest peoples who do not forage. 
Note 8. Even though the Pleistocene overkill hypothesis has been recently discredited and replaced by 
explanations based on the influences of climate change (Cooper et al., 2015). 
Note 9. E.g., the Natufians in the Levant, the Ertebolle culture in Northern Europe, the Pitted Ware 
Culture in Scandinavia, the Jomon culture in Japan (…), all existed during the prehistoric period. More 
recent examples are provided by peoples who were living (until at least 1500 AD) on the American 
North-West coast. 
Note 10. E.g., wild cereals, anadromous fish, shellfish, sea mammals (…). 
Note 11. As pointed out by what economists call the “transaction costs approach”. 
Note 12. Otherwise we may also assume that the total population is divided in two separate groups, 
foragers and farmers, and that the relative weight of both groups is evolving over time. 
Note 13. E.g., bushmeat (provided by hunting game) and meat of reared animals are very close 
substitutes. Cereals, harvested from the wild or cultivated, can also be considered as close substitutes. 
Note 14. E.g., due to harsh climatic conditions or unfertile soils. 
Note 15. E.g., when farmers produce any edible plants (crop) and that foragers extract non edible wild 
resources used as raw materials (bamboos, rattan, medicinal plants…). 
Note 16. Goods can also be described as close but imperfect substitutes. 
Note 17. The Social embeddedness position is associated with the “substantivist school” in anthropology, 
identified especially with Polanyi (1944). 
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Note 18. One may even say that there is an analogy between sharing and macroeconomic analysis. 
Indeed, according to Keynes, there is in the latter a link (at the macroeconomic level) between the 
demand and the supply through the income distribution. In the typical foraging economy, such link also 
exists. The wild resources that are shared are considered by those who forage as an implicit tax, and as a 
subsidy by those who receive these resources. Sharing then affects the whole income distribution, exactly 
as the Welfare State did in the Keynesian macroeconomic analysis. 
Note 19. For more on this topic, see Tisdell (2014, 2015). 
 
